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Summary: The article analyses the difficulties in creating an internal market for services with  
special regard to the accession of the new Member States. Starting from the example of job  
losses in Germany that are blamed on the application of the freedom to provide services to  
the new Member States, the article goes on to describe the Commission’s proposal for a new  
directive on services in the internal market. The decision to withdraw the proposal in its ori-
ginal form is explained. Possible restrictions of the freedom are analysed with regard to the  
requirements which the ECJ has derived from the Treaty. On the basis of this case-law, fears  
of a ‘race to the bottom’ are analysed and regulatory options are assessed. It is concluded  
that the principle of mutual recognition has to be the basis of any solid attempt to create a  
functioning internal market also for services. Nevertheless, the fears existing in the old Mem-
ber States – although at least partly unfounded – need to be taken seriously. Some form of  
harmonisation might be the price to be paid for making borders within the EU permeable to  
services.
I. Introduction
From the moment the Eastern enlargement of the EU became a realistic perspective, the pre-
servation of social standards has been a concern in the old Member States. In many of these 
countries, social standards are high and the welfare state might even form an important ele-
ment of the collective national identity. Consequently, the accession of states that have much 
lower standards has been regarded not only as a great chance and a historical obligation, but 
also as a significant risk. These concerns lead to the problematic restrictions on the free move-
ment of workers and the freedom to provide services that Germany, for example, has opted 
for in the process of negotiating the terms of accession1. In political discussions, these restric-
tions have frequently been brought into play in order to respond to fears that Germany might 
literally be swamped by people prepared to work for much lower wages and at much lower 
social standards than German workers are accustomed to2. 
In the meantime, it has become clear that these restrictions can be circumvented easily, as the 
restrictions regarding the freedom to provide services are far less rigid3. For that reason, all it 
needs is an employer who chooses not to employ workers, but to hire a service provider who 
then will make sure that he fulfils the same tasks as those that were originally fulfilled by 
formally employed workers. This service provider can produce at much lower costs, as he 
generally employs workers in accordance with the standards of his country of origin. Whether 
or not the prerequisites for applying the freedom to provide services are indeed met and in 
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1 See Peter Tempel, The European Integration: A Policy toward Stability, Growth, and Employment, in: Bernard 
Funk/Lodovico Pizzati (ed.), LABOR, EMPLOYMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE EU ENLARGEMENT PROCESS: CHANGING 
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS (2002) Washington D.C.: The World Bank, p. 215 (217 f.).
2 Arguments summarized by Carsten Nowak, EU-Osterweiterung, Personenfreizügigkeit und staatliche Schutz-
pflichten im Bereich der sozialen Sicherheit (2003) 101 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 102.
3 See Matthias Pechstein/Philipp Kubicki, Dienstleistungsfreiheit im Baugewerbe für polnische Handwerker 
(2004) 6 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 167 et seq.
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particular whether or not the provider can really be regarded as self-employed and the con-
tractual relationship as being of temporary character are matters that are very hard to investig-
ate4.The potential consequences can be observed in the German meat industry, where compet-
ition between the various companies is particularly fierce. According to press reports, 26.000 
workers in slaughterhouses have lost their jobs since May 20045. They have been substituted 
by staff formally employed by service providers from the new Member States. These service 
providers pay wages that might be common standard or even rather attractive in their country 
of origin.  Still,  according to a  television report6 the living and working conditions of the 
people working for these companies are miserable. They have to work extremely long hours, 
live in poor accommodation provided by their employers, and they also seem to have prob-
lems getting their promised payment. It is obvious that these conditions produce a climate in 
which it is difficult to investigate the factual and legal circumstances of these business rela-
tionships and to expose illegal practices. Above all, questions arise as to whether the service 
provider really is established in another Member State and whether the activities in the host 
country are of a temporary character7 and whether the requirements set out in the Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers8 are met. In fact, some of the effects that now 
seem to be evidence of negative effects on the German job-market might well be due to a lack 
of application of existing rules rather than a reflection of the scope of the liberalisation instig-
ated by these rules9.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that, under these circumstances, the freedom to provide services – 
at least in Germany – is experienced as causing just the situation that the government has tried 
to avoid by delaying the application of the freedom of workers in the new Member States. 
Unsurprisingly, the plans of the Commission for a new directive on services in the internal 
market have provoked additional concerns. Politically, this was not necessarily to be expected 
since the secretary of state for economy and employment,  Wolfgang Clement, had expressed 
on various occasions that the new directive would be a great chance, as it could provide a 
political incentive to reform outdated structures regarding the German service sector10. Never-
theless, the majority of the government11 now seems to regard this ‘window of opportunity’ as 
offering little more than the prospect of competition Germany and the German government 
have little chances of winning: a race to the bottom in the category ‘wages’ and ‘social stand-
ards’. Additionally, politicians from the left in France and Germany have linked the cause to 
an  ‘ultra-liberal  Europe’  and  have  equated  the  new  directive  to  ‘the  destruction  of  the 
European social model’12.
II. A new directive on services – the proposal of the Commission
In contrast to the concerns described in the introductory remarks, the proposal for the new dir-
ective on services in the internal market that the Commission presented in March 2004 is 
based on a much more optimistic view, namely its job-creating potential. The expectation re-
garding the significant potential for job growth is substantiated by an analysis presented to the 
4 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 44, 22.2.2005, p. 13.
5 Der Spiegel No. 7, 14.2.2005, p. 32 et seq.; Hamburger Abendblatt , 21.3.2005, p. 5.
6 ARD program “report Baden-Baden”, 28.2.2005.
7 See Case C-215/01, Bruno Schnitzer, [2003] para. 26 et seq.
8Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] Official Journal L 018, p.1 – 6.
9 See for example interview with Commissioner Verheugen, Der Spiegel, No. 10/2005, 7.3.2005, p. 30.
10 See quote in Der Spiegel No. 7, 14.2.2005, p. 35; see also The Economist, 12.3.2005, p. 36.
11 The lack of unanimity in the government has been criticised by the opposition; see Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, No. 40, 1.2.2005, p. 14.
12 The Economist, 12/3/2005, p. 36.
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Commission in which the authors of ‘Copenhagen Economics’ predict that net employment 
across the EU could increase by up to 600.000 jobs13. The argument is based on the analysis 
that today services already generate about 70% of GNP as well as many jobs, but that the 
growth potential is not exploited to the full because of the restrictions preventing the provi-
sion of services across borders14. The Commission listed these restrictions in a report on ‘The 
State of the Internal Market for Services’ in 200215.  The plan to eliminate these obstacles 
dates back to the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, where it was seen as one of the 
things that had to be done in order to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic know-
ledge-based economy in the world by the year 201016. As one prerequisite to achieve this aim, 
the Commission suggested that services should move between the Member States as easily as 
within them17.
In the proposed directive, the Commission seeks to remove these barriers for all kinds of ser-
vices with only few exceptions. The approach is based on the idea of a framework directive 
which is not meant to lead to complete harmonisation of standards, but rather attempts to 
tackle the obstacles in a way that leaves the specific features of the Member States’ legal or-
ders unaltered18. Three elements are characteristic of this approach: the country of origin prin-
ciple, the obligation of mutual assistance between national authorities, and other regulative in-
struments such as harmonisation and exceptions from the country of origin principle if this is 
in the general interest. Of these approaches, the country of origin principle is the one which is 
regarded as the cause of the negative effects which national politicians are trying to prevent19. 
According to this principle, service providers are subject only to the law of the Member State 
in which they are established, so that in principle the host country is not allowed to cause any 
restrictions by additional regulations20. The second aspect refers to the administrative monit-
oring of service providers. 
Even when the law is not itself the reason for obstacles, the administration of the country in 
which the service is provided might apply it in a way that in itself causes an obstruction. 
Therefore, the Commission proposes to force the Member States to introduce ‘single points of 
contact’21. According to this concept, service providers have a right to deal with only one ad-
ministrative body through which they can handle all formalities and all procedures relevant 
for their activity. Additionally, even non-discriminatory authorisation schemes that might lim-
it the access to markets in the respective Member State are generally prohibited as long as 
they are not justified by ‘an overriding reason relating to the public interest’ and less restrict-
ive measures would not be sufficient to pursue the objective22. As far as the topic of harmon-
isation is concerned, the Commission only hints that there might be a need for additional initi-
atives in the field of consumer protection and whenever the functioning of the internal market 
requires common standards23.
13 Copenhagen Economics, Economic Assessment of the Barriers to the Internal Market for Services – Final Re-
port, January 2005.
14 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on services in the internal market, 5.3.3004, COM(2004) 2 final/3, p. 5.
15 COM(2002) 441 final, 30.7.2002.
16 See n. 14 (p. 6).
17 Commission of the European Communities, An Internal Market Strategy for Services, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2000) 888 final, 29.12.2000.
18 See n. 12 (p. 8).
19 Chancellor Schröder is said to have informed the Commission president about his concerns in this respect; see 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 40, 17.2.2005, p. 14.
20 See n. 14 (p. 9).
21 Art. 6, see n. 14.
22 Art. 9 sec. 1 of the proposed directive.
23 Art. 40 of the proposed directive.
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When the Barroso Commission took office, it first gave the impression that it would further 
pursue the proposal with the same vigour as its predecessor. The German Chancellor was re-
ported to have tried to influence the president in a meeting in Brussels, with the French pres-
ident apparently backing the German position. Despite this pressure from some of the old 
Member States, it came as a surprise when, in early March 2005, the Commission agreed to 
change the proposal in many relevant aspect with a clear option to water it down24. Even if 
this was no withdrawal in the formal sense, president José Manuel  Barroso was reported to 
have declared the proposal “politically and technically unworkable” and that serious revision 
was required25. The German Commission responsible for enterprise and industry, Günter Ver-
heugen,  declared  that  the  Commission  had  always  wanted  to  avoid  its  proposal  causing 
“Lohndumping” (wage dumping) 26, thereby implying that the one under discussion might do 
exactly this. Even the rule that can be regarded as the cornerstone of the proposal, namely the 
country of origin principle, was apparently seen as an aspect that needed rewriting27. The sur-
prising fact that, apart from the self-evident lack of political agreement on the various ele-
ments, the technical workability was also called into question shows very clearly the need for 
a sober analysis of the regulatory options and their potential or likely outcomes.
III. The scope of the freedom in the case law of the ECJ and in the treaty
Promoting the freedom to provide services case-by-case has been a task the ECJ fulfilled long 
before secondary legislation was recognised as being required to accomplish the internal mar-
ket in this respect and in order to promote the effective use of this right. On the basis of 
primary Community law, the Court has established principles that apply to cross-border activ-
ities and that remove certain restrictions set up in the national administrations. Considering 
this ever greater amount of case law on the subject, it is hard to determine clear-cut rules 
guiding the  decisions  whether  or  not  a  specific  factual  obstacle  violates  the  fundamental 
freedoms of the EC treaty28. As a general rule, Member States may not force service providers 
to comply with all conditions required for establishments of their own nationals, as this would 
deprive the freedom of its practical effectiveness29. Article 49 of the Treaty is interpreted as 
requiring the elimination not only of discriminatory rules, but of any restrictions that render it 
at least less attractive to provide the services lawfully provided in one Member States also in 
another one30. Therefore, the host Member State – among other things – is not allowed to 
make the service provider ‘subject to an obligation to be entered on the trades register which 
delays, complicates or renders more onerous the provision of its services’31. These rules fol-
low the same rationale as the country of origin principle in the proposal by the Commission . 
If these rules were applied in a strict sense and without exceptions, then the proposal for the 
24 The Economist 12.3.2005, p. 36.
25 Financial Times Europe, 1.3.2005., p. 1.
26 Interview with Der Spiegel, No. 10/2005, 7.3.2005, p. 30.
27 Financial Times Europe, 1.3.2005, p. 1.
28 Claus Dieter Classen, Die Grundfreiheiten im Spannungsfeld von europäischer Marktfreiheit und mitglied-
staatlichen Gestaltungskompetenzen (2004) 416 Europarecht, p. 426.
29 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] European Court Reports I-4221, para 12; C-
165/98, Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, as the party ci-
villy liable, third parties: Eric Guillaume and Others [2001] European Court Reports I-2189, para. 23.
30 Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] European Court Reports I-4221, para. 12; C-
43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v Office des Migrations Internationales [1994] European Court Reports I-3803, 
para. 14; C-222/95, Société civile immobilière Parodi v Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie [1997] European Court 
Reports I-3899, para. 18; C-369/96 and C-376/96, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Ar-
blade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] Euro-
pean Court Reports I-8453, para. 33; C-58/98, Josef Corsten [2000] European Court Reports I-7919, para. 33.
31 See n.7 (para. 40).
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new directive would, of course, not be needed, as cross-border activities would have to be un-
restricted on the basis of the treaty provisions. 
The legal situation becomes much more complex, though, when one takes into account the ex-
ceptions to this clear-cut rule. The minimum wage is one of the most prominent examples of a 
rule the Member States are allowed to apply also to service providers established in another 
Member State if they have employees working, even temporarily, in that country32. The Dir-
ective concerning the posting of workers33 has further elaborated this rule. Nevertheless, an 
obligatory contribution to the host Member States’ social security funds is not justified if no 
social advantage is conferred on the workers in question34. In an early judgement on this free-
dom, the ECJ decided that ‘specific requirements imposed on the person providing the service 
cannot be considered incompatible with the treaty where they have as their purpose the ap-
plication of professional rules justified by the general good’35. Restrictions of the freedom 
have also been accepted if they serve the purpose of ‘guaranteeing the quality of skilled trade 
work and of protecting those who have commissioned such work’36.
The judgements of the ECJ regarding apparent evasions of national rules have been ambigu-
ous37. In TV 10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media, the ECJ ruled that the Member States are 
allowed to regard service providers established in another Member State as domestic ones, 
‘since the aim of that measure is to prevent organizations which establish themselves in an-
other Member State from being able, by exercising the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, 
wrongfully to avoid obligations under national law’38. The same approach was taken with re-
gard to the professional rules of conduct that apply in a Member State when the activities of a 
service provider are principally directed toward that state although he is established in another 
one39. 
More recently, this topic has come to the fore with regard to the company law of the Member 
States. In Centros,40 the ECJ had to assess the impact of the freedom to provide services on 
the  registration of  companies.  The Danish authorities  had refused to register  a  branch of 
Centros,  a private limited company registered in England and Wales, in Denmark on the 
grounds that the true intention was to establish a principal establishment and to circumvent 
the national rules, namely the ones regarding the paying-up of minimum capital. The Court 
ruled that failing to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the laws of an-
other Member State was contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty. What is remarkable with 
regard to the topic under discussion is the fact that for the case to fall within the scope of 
Community law the ECJ regarded it as ‘immaterial that the company was formed in the first 
Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in the second, where its main, or in-
32 Joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils  
SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] European Court Re-
ports I-8453, para. 42; C-165/98, Criminal proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assi-
stance SARL, as the party civilly liable, third parties: Eric Guillaume and Others [2001] European Court Re-
ports I-2189, para. 28.
33 See n. 8.
34 Joined cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils  
SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96) [1999] European Court Re-
ports I-8453, para. 52.
35 Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnij-
verheid [1974] European Court Reports 1299, para. 12.
36 C-58/98, Josef Corsten [2000] European Court Reports I-7919, para. 38.
37 See n. 3 (p. 169).
38 Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media [1994] European Court Reports I-04795, para. 21.
39 Case 33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnij-
verheid [1974] European Court Reports 1299, para. 13 et seq.
40 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] European Court Reports I-1459.
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deed entire,  business is  to be conducted’41.  In  Inspire Art,42 the Court ruled that  Member 
States were not allowed to impose on secondary establishments of companies which were 
formed in accordance with the law of another Member State conditions such as minimum cap-
ital and directors’ liability.  Thus, the case law could well be described as legalising under 
European law business strategies that, according to national legal standards, would clearly be 
repudiated on the grounds of evading binding requirements.
IV. The ‘race to the bottom’ and specific problems of the Eastern enlargement
The fears expressed in some of the old Member States are closely linked to the feeling that 
further market integration might turn into a ‘race to the bottom’. One element of this fear 
were already mentioned in the introductory remarks: since enterprises can take advantage of 
the cheaper labour costs in other  – especially Eastern European – countries,  the Member 
States applying higher standards might have to make some adjustments to their own systems 
in order to guarantee a high level of employment. What makes the whole problem even more 
severe is the fact that the new directive is also regarded as a threat for standards in other 
fields. Apart from fears about what is called ‘social dumping’, it is also said to be disadvant-
ageous for consumers, standards in agriculture and the environment in general43. Some of the 
leading German experts on fair trading law have expressed their concerns that the country of 
origin principle might contradict basic prerequisites of effective consumer protection44. They 
complain that service providers have to comply with the laws regarding fair trading in their 
country of origin. Consequently,  advertisement that might be illegal in one Member State 
might well be legal in the one the service providers is established in. These experts predict 
that the national authorities will probably not be very inclined to prevent these practices from 
taking place abroad especially as long as the courts in the other Member State claim jurisdic-
tion in this regard. Another aspect criticised is the delay the country of origin principle causes 
with regard to legal remedies. While at present the national courts can grant interim injunc-
tions within a very short time, they would, according to this principle, be obliged to apply the 
laws of the country of origin. It is obvious that no judge can possibly be an expert in the legal 
orders of all 24 other Member States. As a result, this lack of expertise will most certainly 
lead to massive delays before legal remedies can become effective.
The discussion about the competitive situation of states and the social standards a country can 
“afford” is not a new one in the history of European integration. An especially precarious oc-
casion dates back to the negotiations on the Maastricht treaty when the UK on grounds of na-
tional sovereignty – which in fact were grounds of the UK’s competitive position – refused to 
accept the so called “Social Charter” and was accordingly granted an opt-out45. Still, a close 
comparison with the case of the Social Charter shows that the situation of the EU after its 
Eastern enlargement is a very special one: harmonisation on the basis of high standards is 
hardly an option since it would bring an end to the competitive advantage of countries that un-
doubtedly have to make up for years of economic malfunctioning. Regrettably, the legitimate 
hope of sharing the economic capacity the EU as a whole stands for is at least partly connec-
ted to this competitive advantage. Consequently, forcing on them the same high standards the 
41 Ibid., para 17; see also Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art  
Ltd [2003] European Court Reports I-10155, para. 96.
42 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] European 
Court Reports I-10155.
43 See Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 37, 15.2.2005, p. 24; see also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 40, 
17.2.2005, p. 14.
44 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung No. 55, 7/3/2005, p. 13.
45 Deirdre Curtin, The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces, CMLR 30 (1993), 17 at 
52 et seq.
6
For citation please use CYELP, volume 1. More information available at www.cyelp.com
old Member States have reached would probably eliminate this legitimate hope or would at 
least decelerate the process of catching up. At the same time, this would call into question the 
complementary expectation of the old Member States which lies behind the strategy to delay 
the complete application of fundamental freedoms from applying also to the new ones. It is 
the expectationthat  the accession states will  “race to the top” and will  have much higher 
growth rates than the average of the more settled economies are able to generate. In other 
words, it is not even certain that in the long run the old Member States would actually benefit 
from measures that in the short term might protect their national standards.
The same situation and especially the same fears regarding a ‘race to the bottom’ can be 
found in a number of policy areas. Among the factually most important ones apart from social 
and employment standards are taxes and the environment. With regard to taxes, the Slovakian 
model with a flat rate of 19% for all personal, corporate and sales taxes introduced in 2003 
has led to some nervous reactions in European high tax countries while many of the Middle 
and Eastern European states are planning to follow this example46. Here, the topic is discussed 
under the heading of ‘tax dumping’ which, as some fear, might erode the tax basis not only in 
the countries that have already introduced it, but also in those high-tax countries that might 
feel the pressure to do the same in order to remain an attractive place for investment and pro-
duction. Especially the net contributors to the EU's budget tend to regard this as simply unfair, 
as their contribution might finance the funds that could enable the recipients to lower their tax 
rates and in this way to lure jobs and investment out of the countries that are net contributors. 
According to this argument,  countries are eventually forced to help eroding their own tax 
basis which is also the basis of their net contributions. With regard to questions of environ-
mental protection, the argument of course has nothing to do with net contributions. Still, since 
it is difficult to internalise all costs and all the effects polluting plants might cause, countries 
with high standards are eager to make sure that their policies do not cost them their share of 
investments and industrial production.
No matter how much evidence there is of the “race to the bottom” really taking place, it can 
hardly be said that the scenario as such is without foundation. Also, it should be beyond doubt 
that these mechanisms concern a number of policy areas which cannot be separated from one 
another. All these policy areas share the feature that harmonisation would be the only com-
pletely effective instrument to remove the mechanisms that are thought to generate the “race 
to the bottom”. At the same time, this option would deprive the new Member States of their 
competitive advantage, which is at the key of hopes to create a Europe with a smaller gap in 
living  conditions.  Also,  applying  EC environmental  standards  fully  to  the  new accession 
states already is accepted as being impossible due to the excessive costs this would cause47. 
All in all, therefore, there a good reasons to carry out a sober analysis of the regulatory op-
tions and their likely effects on the internal market and on the Member States. 
It also has to be borne in mind that the policy areas under discussion have long been identified 
as representing important aspects of the competitive position of the Member States. One of 
the consequences of this is that in these areas any harmonisation that might reduce the com-
petitive advantages of the Member States with low taxes or with low standards can only take 
place in a completely consensual fashion. According to articles 90 ff. of the EC treaty, key de-
cision regarding taxes can only be taken by unanimous decision in the Council. In contrast, 
article  175 sec.  1  renders  article  251 applicable  with  regard  to  environmental  regulation, 
thereby opening the path for majority decisions. What is interesting, though, is the fact, that 
with regard to certain types of environmental regulation – namely ones with a tax character – 
46 See The Economist, 5.3.2005, p. 34.
47 See n. 1 (p. 218).
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article 175 sec. 2 again demands unanimous decisions. Also, article 176 guarantees the oppor-
tunity for Member States to apply higher standards – a rule showing that the Member States 
do not mind if other states impair their competitive position.
V. Regulatory options
The problems associated with the directive on services in the internal market are in many 
ways typical of the regulatory options the EC is generally faced with in the process of creating 
a truly internal market. The fact that the Commission has identified the need for such a direct-
ive illustrates the obstacles service providers are still faced with in the internal market. Al-
though freedom to provide services is a right that has been guaranteed by the treaty for many 
decades, there remain both legal and non-legal obstacles. This seems to be a consequence of 
the fact that even non-discriminatory authorisation schemes hinder foreign service providers 
almost invariably more than the ones established in the respective countries. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to tackle these non-discriminatory schemes with the mechanisms provided by the 
European legal system. They are manifold and it is often hard to tell how valid the reasons of 
general interest put forward by the legislatures really are. Therefore, the legitimacy of the 
Commission’s attempt to remove the legal obstacles and to at least ameliorate the non-legal 
ones should be self-evident. Even if some of the Member States have benefited from the fact 
that the internal market has been far from being accomplished in the area of services, it is hard 
for them to argue that these restrictions need to be preserved in order to achieve certain intern-
al policy objectives. Taken this legal view and the fact that on several occasionsthe improved 
cross-border exchange of services has been described as a job-creating opportunity, the ques-
tion remains as to how opposition to these plans can be justified in the long run.
Even politicians that are anxious to avoid the negative consequences of the Commission’s 
proposals generally stop short of demanding that the standards in the country of provision 
should be the only relevant ones. Rather, one solution is seen to be another delay before the 
freedom takes full effect. Another option lies in exceptions for certain sector – namely build-
ing and health – where competition from cheaper providers might be particularly strong48. 
Again, this solution expresses the hope that the gap between the countries with high labour 
costs and the ones with lower costs might increasingly close under the influence of European 
integration49. Unfortunately, this might lead to a situation in which possible negative effects 
are not prevented, but merely postponed.
Apart from these two solutions, there is another one that for a long time was the dominant ap-
proach to further economic integration. A German social democratic MEP was quoted as fa-
vouring European harmonisation since letting 25 different rules apply contradicted the “idea” 
of the community50. Of course, following this suggestion would mean a clear deviation from 
the present-day consensus that harmonisation, due to its inefficiency and its bureaucratic con-
sequences, should be the option of last resort. The Commission has made it clear that it has no 
intention of harmonising the rules of service provision in the Member States and it discredits 
this  option as  over-regulation and standardisation of the specific  features  of  national  sys-
tems51. With regard to services, the fear is that even minimum standards would impose regula-
tion on countries that have opted for rather liberal regimes52. Since the decision of the ECJ in 
48 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 40, 17.2.2005, p. 14.
49 See n. 2 (p. 104).
50 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 40, 1.2.2005, p. 14.
51 See n. 14 (p. 8).
52 The Economist 12.3.2005, p. 36.
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the case  Cassis de Dijon53, the principle of mutual recognition has generally been acknow-
ledged to be the most efficient way to create an internal market. Still, harmonisation might 
mean different things. If the standards set by EC legislation are low, then the main concern is 
the completion of the internal market. If the standards are high, then policy integration domin-
ates the elements of market integration54. This thought paves the way for a compromise where 
some standards are guaranteed by Community law, while the main mechanism remains mutu-
al recognition.
If one takes seriously the legal obligation and the political commitment to create an internal 
market also for services, then there is generally no legitimate role for obstacles set up by na-
tional legislation. Nevertheless, it would not be justified to leave national employees and the 
people working for service operators across borders unprotected. Considering the problems 
regarding the “race to the bottom”, the solution can certainly be found in legislation at the 
European level alone. Therefore, the competence for some harmonisation does not stem from 
any special competence for social affairs, but rather from the need to find an appropriate en-
vironment for the internal market that will lead to a reduction also in the factual obstacles. To 
this effect, the EC has already produced remarkable legislation. In December 1996 the Direct-
ive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provisions of ser-
vices was passed55. Many hopes for an orderly development are linked to this directive56 be-
cause it offers the mechanisms that should help to protect social standards under the described 
circumstances. Recital 13 explicitly states that ‘the laws of the Member States must be co-
ordinated in order to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection to be ob-
served in the host country by employers who post workers to perform temporary work’. Re-
cital 14 demands ‘a “hard core” of clearly defined protective rules’. Consequently, Article 3 
establishes an obligation on the side of the host country to lay down rules on maximum work 
periods, minimum paid annual holidays, minimum rates of pay, health, safety and hygiene at 
work, and a variety of other rules with regard to the protection of workers.
VI. Future Perspectives
In many ways, the old, the new, and future new Member States are united in the hope that the 
gap regarding the economic and social standards will close. Under the conditions of the in-
ternal market, lower standards might mean not only hardship for the people that are subject to 
them, but also a severe threat for higher standards in the other countries. Fears regarding the 
‘race to the bottom’ might be exaggerated. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that mechan-
isms are in place that might lead to a sort of decentralised harmonisation on a level far below 
the ones achieved in the old Member States. This is not to imply that all national particularit-
ies regarding certain groups of services should be preserved. Achieving a smooth functioning 
of the internal market – apart from being a concept that is generally considered to be worth 
pursuing from an economic point of view – has also become a legal obligation. Therefore, it is 
undoubtedly a legitimate approach to demand some sort of competitiveness from the national 
systems – a competitiveness that has to be tested on the internal market. Not everything that 
cannot survive in this market has a right to be protected from competition. Market access and 
taking up the challenges from foreign competitors has been the idea that formed the basis of 
European integration and its economic model. Therefore, the question remains as to what are 
the minimum standards both to ensure the further development of the internal market and at 
53 Case C-120/78, Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] European Court Reports 649.
54 René Barents, The internal market unlimited: Some observations on the legal basis of Community legislation 
(1993) 30/1 CMLR, 85 (101).
55 See n. 8.
56 See for example interview with Commissioner Verheugen, Der Spiegel, No. 10/2005, 7.3.2005, p. 30.
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the same time to prevent practical problems that might harm the acceptance of further integra-
tion. 
1) Mutual recognition of standards and qualifications
There is no doubt that mutual recognition of standards and qualifications has to be the starting 
point of any further improvement of the functioning of the internal market. The argument that 
is generally applicable in this discussion is the apparent lack of efficiency and the bureaucrat-
ic burden these rules cause. Directive 1999/42/EC establishing a mechanism for the recogni-
tion of qualifications57 offers a perfect example of mutual recognition applied in a way that 
takes into account some of the above-mentioned concerns. According to Article 3 (1) Member 
States are not allowed to refuse a work permit on the same grounds that apply to their own na-
tionals. Instead, they have to compare the knowledge and skills of the nationals of the other 
Member States and – in case of a lack of compatibility – to grant an adaptation period or an 
aptitude test before. 
The accession of the 10 new Member States on May 1st 2004 has generated a new argument. 
Harmonisation of standards at the levels the old Member States have achieved would cause 
costs in production that would destroy the competitive advantage the new Member States 
have. This would not only reduce their legitimate hopes of catching up with the old Member 
States. The old Member States certainly also hope to see the gap to the other countries in the 
Union close since this could also reduce the fears regarding the ‘race to the bottom’. Mutual 
recognition translated into the wording of services regulation induces the application of the 
country of origin principle. Possible negative effects in the implementation of this principle 
can only be prevented by additional regulation that modifies the principle without removing 
its rationale altogether.
2) Minimum harmonisation at European level
Minimum harmonisation on the one hand and maximum harmonisation on the other hand 
have become some sort of legislative ideal types that can be chosen depending on the agree-
ment between the Member States58. Which minimum social standards should apply in cross-
border activities is clearly a matter to be solved by EC legislation. The problems that have 
been described offer sufficient reasons for securing an acceptable standard of worker and con-
sumer protection at the EC level. Any implementation of the country of origin principle re-
quires a sufficient amount of mutual trust in the standards applicable in the other countries. If 
this trust is not in place, new factual disruptions of the functioning of the internal market 
might be a result. In particular, there will always be a strong aspiration on the part of the 
Member States to protect their standards even by doubtful means. A certain amount of har-
monisation has been a typical compensation in directives that establish the country of origin 
principle59. Consequently, if one wants the freedom to provide services to become a reality, 
then one might have to accept that some form of harmonisation may be the price one has to 
pay. The above mentioned directive concerning the posting of workers offers an important 
57 Directive 1999/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 June 1999 establishing a mechanism 
for the recognition of qualifications in respect of the professional activities covered by the Directives on liberal-
isation and transitional measures and supplementing the general systems for the recognition of qualifications 
[1999] Official Journal L 201, p. 77 – 93.
58 See Peter Rott, Minimum Harmonization for the Completion of the Internal Market? The Example of Consu-
mer Sales Law (2003) 40 CMLR, 1107 at 1108 f.
59 Jürgen Basedow, Dienstleistungsrichtlinie, Herkunftslandprinzip und Internationales Privatrecht (2004) Euro-
päische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 423.
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element of  this strategy. In the face of this directive many of the fears regarding social dump-
ing seem exaggerated, if not completely unfounded. Apart from the fact that minimum stand-
ards are of course far lower than the ones achieved in many of the old Member States, it is 
mainly the problem of efficient control mechanisms that gives cause for concern.
3) Implementation, judicial system and administrative co-operation
The ECJ has made it clear that restrictions of the freedom to provide services cannot be justi-
fied if the reasons for them are of a purely administrative nature60. Authorisation procedures 
that apply in the host Member State ‘should neither delay nor complicate exercise of the right 
of persons established in another Member State to provide their services on the territory of the 
first  State’61.  Still,  even  this  legal  guarantee  does  not  seem to  have abolished  all  factual 
obstacles that exist because Member States follow their own system of authorisation and ad-
ministration. In this respect, the Commission proposal has paved the way for a sober analysis 
of the problems that stem not from the regulatory approach as such, but from the implementa-
tion of the rules. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful whether the Commission proposal can be the 
final word in this respect. Of course, the co-operation between the various administrations as 
well as the permanent evaluation of the mechanisms in place as envisaged in the proposal are 
important aspects of any concept for improving the elements of the internal market. The prob-
lem is that these rather far-reaching proposals might be good enough to remove obstacles that 
hinder the provision of services across borders. They certainly are not sufficient to prevent 
practices that are clearly illegal from taking place. Especially in the administration of worker 
protection, an organised system for co-operation and exchanges of information is crucial62. If 
one also takes into account the above mentioned problems of access to efficient legal remed-
ies, these administrative and judicial questions might well prove to be at the core of the en-
deavour of finding acceptable solutions within the existing and indeed any new legal frame-
work.
60 See n.36, para. 42; See n.34, para. 37.
61 See n.36, para. 47.
62 See n. 34, para. 79.
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